Hurricane Katrina devastated the city of New Orleans in late August 2005, resulting in damage to much of the city's sports infrastructure and the temporary departure of both of New Orleans' major league professional sports teams, the National Football League Saints and the National Basketball Association Hornets. The city spent over $500 million restoring the sports infrastructure in New Orleans, and both teams subsequently returned to the city. In addition, New Orleans has since hosted numerous mega-sporting events including the Super Bowl, NCAA Men's Basketball Final Four, and several college football national championships. This paper examines the economic impact of Hurricane Katrina on professional sports in New Orleans and traces the recovery of the city in conjunction with spectator sports.
redevelopment dollars toward its sports infrastructure and to ask whether New Orleans benefited economically from its role as host to major professional sports teams and a disproportionate number of mega-sports events given its size and demographics. Did commercial sports enable a rebuilding of New Orleans's storm-ravaged infrastructure or did it force civic trade-offs made even more painful by the storm? Independent scholarship in general has not supported the thesis that professional sports induce significant increases in economic activity for host cities. New Orleans, however, may be different. The city is smaller and less affluent than other host cities in general, and it may be that the frequency with which large sports events are hosted by New Orleans makes the area an exception to the experience of most cities with regard to sports and economic development. The gravity of the city's economic situation in the wake of Katrina necessitates an individual and more complete appraisal as the strategies for economic redevelopment are evaluated thirteen years after the storm. Answers to the questions raised in this introduction require a review of, among other things, New
Orleans' place in the national professional sports landscape, the extent of the damage Katrina wrought, the amount of redevelopment money the city must commit, and the evidence with regard to the impact sports has on host city economies with special attention to the circumstances that surrounded New Orleans in its rebuilding period.
II. New Orleans Prior to Katrina
While New Orleans hosts major league franchises in both the NFL and NBA, with a pre-hurricane metropolitan area population of less than 1.6 million residents, the city was already a small market for any of the major sports leagues in the U.S. As shown in Table 1 Instead of fans, the NFL seeks corporations...While the NBA and Major League Baseball have guaranteed contracts for their players, the NFL with its exorbitant TV rights deals and corporate backing has practically given their owners guaranteed dollars…
The way business is done now is the owner convinces his buddies who own the largest businesses in their respective cities to buy majority (sic) of the season tickets and luxury boxes. The result: a term exclusive to the NFL, the guaranteed sellout. Saints owner Tom Benson can't do that in New Orleans because there are no major corporations other than Entergy to back him. (Terrebonne Parrish Courier, 2005) The competition to host a professional sports team is often as fierce as the competition among athletes on game day, and the lack of population base and both personal and corporate wealth places New Orleans at a considerable disadvantage in supporting and, therefore, retaining either the Saints or the Hornets. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, in fact, New Orleans appeared to be on the verge of losing its NFL franchise. (Robinson, 2005) . The lucrative offer Benson received for the team reflects at least in part the money-making potential of NFL teams, which is explained in large part by the subsidies cities extend to attract a supply of teams that is limited by the NFL and its owners. The value of the Saints has only risen since 2005.
Forbes estimates that the franchise was valued at $2 billion in 2017. (Forbes, 2017) While recognizing New Orleans' shortcomings as it relates to its ability to host professional sports, on the other side of the coin, the city caters to the tourist trade to an extent that distinguishes itself from almost every other American city. The infrastructure that New Orleans has created arguably provides a comparative advantage in hosting events to include commercial sports over most cities in the United States. The city's performance in attracting outside events supports the idea that it has exercised its comparative advantage. Even though New Orleans is a relatively small city, it ranked fifth in the United States in the number of conventions hosted (Tennessean News Services, 2005) . Prior to the storm New Orleans annually attracted more than 10 million visitors who spent in excess of $5 billion per year according to the New Orleans Metropolitan and Tourism Bureau.
The information recorded in Tables 3 and 4 Orleans had a significantly larger tourist component than did the United States overall and most other southern cities in the U.S. that hosted NBA or NFL teams. It is noteworthy that New Orleans tourist sector as measured by employees and payroll in NAICS 7 is roughly 25 percent larger than that of Miami, Florida, which is among the most tourist-friendly cities in the country, and trails only Orlando, home of Disneyworld.
Commercial sport, of course, is one important aspect of the tourist/leisure industry, and it could have played a role in the economic revitalization of New Orleans.
Since opening in 1975, the Superdome has hosted numerous sporting events of national significance including the NFL 's Super Bowl in 1978 , 1981 , 1986 , 1990 , 1997 , and 2013 (Holder, 2018 and the National Intercollegiate Athletic Association Men's Basketball Final Four in 1982 , 1987 , 1993 Replacing the infrastructure for professional sports and mega-sports events can be justified if the benefits provided by the facilities exceed the costs incurred in the reconstruction. Both costs and benefits have to be measured over time since the facilities provided a stream of benefits as well as generating costs associated with operations and maintenance (O&M). Comprehensive economic analysis would include not only the explicit benefits but also the implicit benefits and costs, which are difficult not only to measure but in many cases to identify.
Data do exist for New Orleans for the number of establishments, annual payroll, and number of employees for a variety of entertainment related industries defined according to the NAICS and these data are recorded in Table 5 .
All data point to the fact that the economic activity accounted for through the "Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation" industry (NAICS 71) for New Orleans is absolutely small, but large when compared to the United States overall. Census data, thus, supports the idea that New Orleans is a tourist-based economy that exhibits an artsentertainment-recreation industry that is larger than that characterizing the United States as a whole.
The contribution of "Spectator Sports" (NAICS 7112), however, is less than 1 percent by any of the measures identified in Table 3 . Despite the high salaries paid professional athletes, the spectator sports industry typically accounts for less than 1 percent of a city's payroll, and, by that measure, the industry is not economically vital to cities in the United States in general to include New Orleans.
Numerous studies of both professional sports franchises and stadiums as well as of mega-events, furthermore, lend support to the notion that sports have little impact on local economies. Analyses of the Super Bowl (Baade and Matheson, 2006; Porter, 1999) , NCAA Final Four , and mega-events in general (Coates and Humphreys, 2002; , for example, have all concluded that these big sporting events have no statistically significant impact on any number of economic variables such as employment, per capita income, metropolitan area-wide gross domestic product, or taxable sales. Coates and Depken (2006) indicated ambivalence about the economic contribution of sports mega-events concluding, "The upshot is, therefore, that these mega-events are not necessarily the economic windfall that their proponents portray them to be." Stadiums and professional franchises (Baade and Dye, 1990; Coates and Humphreys, 1999; similarly show little in the way of economic benefits for host cities.
Given the economically tenuous state of professional sports in New Orleans prior to Hurricane Katrina, it is difficult to imagine that a disaster of its magnitude would improve to prospects for the industry in the city. The next section of the paper summarizes the extent of the damage with a particular emphasis on the demographic changes that may be sufficiently long-lived to have adversely influenced the prospects for supporting professional sports in New Orleans in the long term.
III. Measuring Katrina's Devastation
Hurricane Katrina, which swept into New Orleans and the Gulf Coast on August 29, 2005, caused far and away the largest damages in real dollar terms of any hurricane in U.S. history, with uninsured losses topping $100 billion (Bloomberg News, 2005) and insured losses estimated at $34.4 billion (Powell, 2005) . Its final death toll of over 1,400 also places it among the worst natural disasters ever suffered by the United States. New
Orleans was particularly hard hit by the storm, as flood waters remained for weeks after Katrina while levies were repaired, and rebuilding the city was an epic undertaking unmatched in scope and expense in recent U.S. history.
The cost of reconstructing New Orleans itself has been placed at more than $100 billion dollars (Tennessean News Service, 2005) . Approximately 80 percent of New Orleans' 188,000 occupied housing units were severely damaged by the storm.
Furthermore, more than half of the city's 100,000 owner-occupied homes were built before 1950, and their repair and replacement will require expensive modifications to meet modern building codes designed to prevent future hurricane damage (Tennessean News Service, 2005) .
The damage to middle class neighborhoods has substantial implications for the redevelopment effort both as it relates to production and consumption. Without a middle class, New Orleans will not have the workers it needs to run the economy that existed prior to Katrina, and the spending necessary to restore the economy to pre-hurricane levels will be deficient. Katrina devastated the housing stock, schools, and other infrastructure vital to normal life for all socio-economic classes.
The extent of the damage to the social infrastructure must also be carefully assessed since the return of middle class workers and consumers is essential to the revitalization of the New Orleans economy. Even before Katrina, by nearly every measure of economic development, New Orleans lagged behind other large American cities. Labor force participation rates and employment to population ratios in New Orleans averaged 5 to 10 percent below national levels for most demographic groups (Gabe, et al., 2005) . Hurricane damaged areas in Louisiana had poverty rates above the national average (21.4% vs. 12.4%), and New Orleans residents were less likely (55% vs. 66%) to live in owner-occupied housing than residents of other large cities (Gabe, et al., 2005) . Finally, the educational attainment of younger adults (age 18 to 34) for stormdamaged areas was generally below that for the rest of the nation. For example, 22.9 percent of young adults in hurricane damaged areas had not completed a high school degree compared with 20.6 percent nationwide, while only 22.5 percent had completed a college degree compared with 29.3 percent nationwide (Gabe, et al., 2005) .
These figures had several implications for the likelihood that displaced people would return. First, Katrina hit the economically disadvantaged hardest. Statistics indicate that other places in the nation to which they have relocated improved their opportunities for employment. Second, significant portions of the middle class were displaced in the storm-ravaged area; 47.4 percent of those displaced had education equivalent to some college or above (Gabe, et al., 2005) . Third, 45 percent of those displaced did not live in homes that they owned indicating that a significant portion of the people displaced by Hurricane Katrina had weak financial ties to the communities they 
IV. The Economy of New Orleans Post-Katrina and the Sports Industry
The New Orleans economy served the nation as a tourist center and transportation hub for water transport in particular as previously noted, and therefore, any economic redevelopment effort should focus on those industries, an opinion endorsed by members of an ad hoc committee of urban experts assembled under the auspices of the Urban Land Institute. The information in Table 6 , to be specific, indicates that in July 2005, 32.9 percent of the labor force in New Orleans was employed in the "Trade and Transportation" and "Leisure and Hospitality" sectors. The numbers recorded in Table 6 indicate several things worthy of note as it relates to characterizing the New Orleans economy pre-and post-Katrina. First, the transportation/trade and leisure/hospitality industries, the cornerstones of the New Orleans economy, did recover to some extent.
Employment in the transportation and trade sector remain below their pre-Katrina levels, but the numbers employed in the leisure and hospitality sector have fully recovered and now exceed their pre-Katrina levels by a modest amount.
Hurricane Katrina led to a significant temporary contraction of the leisure industry. In the immediate aftermath of the storm there were fewer people flying into New Orleans in comparison to pre-Katrina levels, and a smaller number of establishments to accommodate them. Nearly one year after Katrina, the number of retail food establishments was 44 percent of the level prior to the storm, and the number of hotels open remained below the pre-Katrina level.
Even now over a decade after the storm New Orleans has not fully returned to the population and economic activity levels that existed prior to the storm, although tourism appears to be a fairly bright spot overall. There is compelling scholarship by Davis and Weinstein (2002) to suggest that population and economic activity across cities and regions within a country are not random occurrences, but rather reflect "locational fundamentals," e.g., location on a coast or significant river (physical geography), and economies of scale emanating from "economic clustering." The Davis and Weinstein study is based on 8,000 years of data on Japanese regions, and Japan's population is far more homogenous than that characterizing the United States. The population of New Orleans is particularly diverse.
Other scholarship supports the importance of locational fundamentals in explaining developments relating to population movements following catastrophic events. Evidence following the Chicago Fire of 1871, indicates that the City's recovery from that event depended on location fundamentals specific to neighborhoods (Macaulay, 2005) . More recently, economic recovery from the 1992 Rodney King riots in Los Angeles was notably slow as compared to Miami's experience following the devastation of Hurricane Andrew in the same year . Taken together, these findings suggest that heterogeneity as it relates in part to ethnicity, shared values and culture, income and wealth, and education can retard redevelopment and efforts to resettle. Many New Orleans neighborhoods where redevelopment has been slow to occur exhibit marked variation in these characteristics and relatively low rates of home ownership as previously mentioned.
So, what role did spectator sports play in the economy of New Orleans as it attempted to recover from Hurricane Katrina's devastation? First, it is important to note that the Superdome itself, which served an ill-fated role as a center for 30,000 refugees who were unable to escape the city prior to the storm, suffered extensive damage due to Katrina as did other sports facilities throughout the city. In the immediate aftermath of the storm, immediate decisions needed to be made as to the extent of repairs that the city would undertake. Following any emergency repairs, additional consideration would be given towards long-term upgrades to the facility. Finally, the city needed to decide the extent to which it would make direct subsidies available to the city's professional sports teams in order to have the return to and remain in the city.
The extent of the devastation caused by Katrina coupled with the demographic character of New Orleans prior to the storm led to the prospect that residents of the city would resettle elsewhere in the country. The likelihood that New Orleans would return to its pre-Katrina state, in turn, clearly had a bearing on probability that professional sports teams would be able to remain in the city for the long-term. If the chances increased that pro-sport teams will eventually leave due to a lack of fan support that had implications for the efficacy of substantial public investments to replace or repair the professional sports infrastructure. (Associated Press, 2011) While the NFL as a league pledged $20 million towards these repairs, Saints owner Tom Benson, the primary tenant of the facility, paid nothing towards its reconstruction. Louisiana had only a $500 million insurance policy on state buildings along with $100 million in flood insurance, and the Superdome was just one of the many public buildings including schools damaged by the storm, so some have questioned the priority placed on this facility (Corbett, 2006) . Paradoxically, the extent of the devastation and the significant pressure exerted on the public sector to demonstrate its resolve and ability to help the city recover enhanced the prospects that those edifices most representative of the city to the outside world would be restored. Delaney and Eckstein (2003) The economic incentive for the Saints owner to keep the team in New Orleans was compromised by Katrina. As the small economy of New Orleans lacked the financial wherewithal to support professional sports in the same manner as other cities, especially following Katrina, the Saints increasingly turned to public subsidies to generate revenues for its billionaire owner. Furthermore, unlike the efforts made by large oil companies and small business alike to repair the capital-intensive oil refineries as well as small restaurants and shops in and around the city, there existed little motivation for the Saints to recoup their small investment in infrastructure. This points to a larger problem with the financial structure of the professional sports industry throughout the United States. Namely, the existence of substantial subsidies for infrastructure undermines a team's commitment to its host city. Absent any meaningful risk to their own capital, what incentive does a team have to stay in a city that experiences a catastrophe on the scale of Hurricane Katrina if the team has little in the way of permanent infrastructure invested in its host city? There is little question that in the vast majority of cases the financial risk accompanying hosting professional sports in the United States is disproportionately borne by the host community. Katrina provided striking testimony to the reality of how subsidies for sports infrastructure have contributed to that financial vulnerability.
Consumer spending on spectator sports by local residents probably also serves to slow down the recovery of the local economy after a natural disaster. The money spent on attending a sports event by residents of the home-team community necessarily precludes them from spending that money on other locally owned and operated entertainment.
Furthermore, local expenditures on professional sports may actually reduce total spending in the economy as opposed to simply reallocating money among competing ends. Professional sports, which use national resource markets as opposed to locally owned and operated resources for alternative entertainment or recreational activities, may foster a net outflow of money. Most of the money spent on a night at a professional sports event goes to the athletes and owners of the team who may not live in the community in which they play. Siegfried and Zimbalist (2002) note that while 93% of average employees live in the area where they work, only 29% of NBA players do the same (and the figures are likely to be similar in the NFL and other major leagues). Given the generally poor condition of the city following Katrina, it is even less likely that millionaire athletes, and those with the financial wherewithal to live elsewhere, chose to reside in the Big Easy in the immediate aftermath of the hurricane. Certainly, owner Tom Benson, who had business interests in San Antonio among other cities, showed little interest in spending money in the city.
Furthermore, the devastation of the middle and lower classes in New Orleans eliminated not just the customers, but also the labor upon which professional sports relies. Each large event at the Superdome requires approximately 2,500 part-time workers. Unfortunately, the lack of housing in New Orleans meant that no such pool of potential part-time workers was readily available in the city. Indeed, good fraction of the workers at the facility will very likely have to come from outside the city. The leakage of money from New Orleans through athletes repatriating their incomes to their primary residences were further enhanced by ordinary workers doing the same thing in some appreciable amount because of a lack of housing in many New Orleans neighborhoods.
Post-Katrina, it was even less likely that income generated through commercial sports activities remained in the city.
The prospect of hosting mega-events was perhaps a more important incentive in repairing the city's sports infrastructure. As noted previously, the city was a frequent destination for major sporting events such as the Super Bowl or college bowl games. The fans' response, however, failed to impress the Saints owner who noted that, "You haven't seen the total commitment yet. No National Football League team can live on tickets alone… The next big step is that the business community needs to step up." (Corbett, 2006) Limited by the small number of large corporations in the city and the redevelopment priorities faced by the city's small businesses, 40% of the Superdome's luxury suites remained unsold as of May 2006. As luxury suites are not part of the league's revenue sharing deal, they provide significant profits to a team's owner. The fact that Tom Benson was unsatisfied with the millions spent on the first wave of stadium repairs and improvements entirely paid for by others and with record season ticket purchases by local residents boded ill for the Saints' long-term future in New Orleans.
Indeed, as noted previously, it took another nearly $400 million in tax subsidies and another round of taxpayer financed improvements to the Superdome to convince Benson to commit the team to New Orleans through 2025. (Alexander 2013) It remains to be seen whether the team will be able to maintain its extraordinary level of fan interest in such a small market if the team's fortunes on the field wane. And as noted by Benson, relatively high revenues are the key to keeping teams, but that requires more than ticket sales. Even with strong attendance and generous revenue sharing from the league, the team only ranks in the middle of NFL franchises in terms of annual revenue and is near the bottom in franchise valuation. (Forbes, 2017) While the majority of the media attention focused on the return of the Saints to the city, New Orleans' other franchises experienced changes in the wake of Katrina. The Professional sports teams were not the only organizations to engage in sportsrelated investment following Hurricane Katrina. Tulane University, for example, engaged in a significant reconstruction program for its athletic complexes as part of its $250 million campus-wide rehabilitation effort following the hurricane (Henderson, 2006) . Tulane, unlike the Saints, has a huge financial commitment in its campus, and it is motivated to recoup its past investment. Division 1 intercollegiate sports serve as a recruitment tool for both athletes and prospective students as the school attempts to rebuild its student body.
Apart from permanent sports franchises, mega-events also contributed to the redevelopment of the city. The country's major sports leagues were eager to appear as 
VIII. Conclusions and Policy Implications
Hurricane Katrina induced a massive outflow of residents and businesses from the city of New Orleans. The city's two major professional sports teams, the NFL Saints and NBA Hornets were among the businesses that had to leave due to the extensive damage to their infrastructure. The capital costs and other financial commitments necessary to encourage the return of the Saints and the Hornets for the long term were substantial.
The images of the NFL and NBA would have been damaged if the Saints and Hornets had not at least make cameo appearances, but in the longer term, the teams and their leagues demanded greater revenue streams than can be generated in their current facilities. The fact that New Orleans and the State of Louisiana were already directly subsidizing the teams indicates that pre-Katrina the teams were not generating revenues in their venues that allowed them to be financially competitive in their leagues. This paper has concluded that it may have been financially ill-advised in the post-Katrina world to direct substantial funds at refurbishing and upgrading the Superdome and New
Orleans arena or to continue to directly subsidize the franchises specifically to make the teams financially competitive. New Orleans will be rebuilt at the grassroots home by home and business by business. Locational fundamentals may well lead to the restoration of New Orleans long term. The rate at which the city was resettled and restored affected the ability of the NFL Saints and NBA Hornets to generate revenues that encouraged them to remain in the community. The Saints and the Hornets have invested little in infrastructure, and are motivated in large part by the size of future revenue streams in New Orleans relative to other cities that would like to host them. The City of New Orleans, on the other hand, has invested substantially in infrastructure for the teams, and, as a first step found it necessary to invest further in that infrastructure necessary to encourage the teams to stay.
That stay would have been short-lived in the absence of the return of the middle class so necessary to support the team and give the city any chance to recoup its infrastructure investment. To achieve this end, the order of capital expenditures in New Orleans should have been levees, housing, middle class amenities, infrastructure for nonresident businesses, and lastly those industries that cater to the entertainment needs of the middle class.
The role of sports in the economic recovery of the city is dubious aside from serving as a symbol that the city remains vital. The repair of the Superdome and the New Orleans Arena was an expensive tease in that regard. The investment in sports infrastructure did little to provide what was needed for the community to recover from the storm. Sports and the hosting of mega-events may actually undermine longer-term recovery through deflecting capital spending from where it is needed most and crowding out those workers and residents who are involved in the essential rebuilding process.
Sport may have provided a pleasant recreational amenity to returning residents, but it is reasonable to ask whether the economic interests of the sport elites, out of financial and economic development necessity, should have taken a seat on the bench in the interest of the greater good. 
